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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TIRE RATIONING -

Plaintiff, Price Administrator, sought to enjoin 1 defendants from selling rubber
tires and tubes to consumers without tire rationing certificates as required by
the tire rationing regulations.2 Defendants contended that the regulations were
void under the Fifth Amendment as taking of property without due process of
law and without just or any compensation. Held, judgment for plaintiff. The
tire rationing regulations, a proper exercise of the war powers vested by Congress in the President or some duly constituted department, agency, or officer
of the federal government, are not in contravention of the prohibition of the
Fifth Amendment against the taking of private property for public use without

See 51 YALE L. J. 1196 (1942); 42 CoL. L. REv. 1170 (1942); 55 HARV.
427 (1942).
.
2 By Act of May 31, 1941 (55 Stat. L. 236) Congress amended the Act of June
;1.8, 1940 (54 Stat. L. 676) by providing that "Whenever the President is satisfied
that the fulfillment of requirements for the defense of the United States will result in
a shortage in the supply of any material for defense or for private account or for export,
the President may allocate such material in such manner and to such extent as he shall
deem necessary or appropriate in the public interest and to promote the national
defense •.•. The President may exercise any power, authority, or discretion conferred
on him by this section, through such department, agency, or officer of the Government
as he may direct and in conformity with any rules and regulations which he may
prescribe." Pursuant to the Act of June 28, 1940, and the amendment by Act of May
31, 1941, the President created the Office of Production Management [Executive
Order 8629, 6 FED. REG. 191 (1941)] and within it the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply [Executive Order 8734, 6 FED. REG. 1917 (1941)] the
latter ·becoming the Office of Price Administration [Executive Order 8875, 6 FED.
REG. 448 3 ( 1941)]. Subsequently the President created the War Production Board
[Executive Order 9024, 7 FED. REG. 329 (1942) ], which took over the powers of
the Office of Production Management [Executive Order 9040, 7 FED. REG. 527
( 1942) ] • On January 24, 1942, the War Production Board granted to the Office
of Price Administration authority to carry out the powers as to rationing materials
conferred by Congress upon the President. Directive No. 1, 7 FED. REG. 562 (1942).
The tire rationing regulations issued by the Office of Price Administration are found
in 6 FED. REG. 6406, 6792, 6795 (1941) and 7 FED. REG. 72, 925, 1027, 1089
(1942).
1
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due process of law or just compensation. Henderson v. Bryan, (D. C. Cal.
1942) 46 F. Supp. 682. 8
Governmental action to effectuate economic mobilization for war may
impinge upon property rights through ( l) direct acquisition of private property
by the government and (2) regulation with respect to what the owner may do
with his property. Defendants' contention as to the unconstitutionality of tire
rationing raises the question of the line of demarcation between a taking of
private property compensable under the Fifth Amendment and property losses
resulting from governmental regulation for which there is no constitutional
requirement of compensation. "The line between expropriation and regulation
is often very misty; but in the main, if the claimant can show no particular
injury other than that suffered by other members of the public, and no physical
appropriation by the government, a 'regulation' rather than 'a taking' is likely
to be found. Hardship s~ffered by a restriction on the use of property has been
held not to be a constitutional objection." 4 The challenged regulations do not
involve direct appropriation of defendants' property by the government, nor
injury to their property in a physical sense, nor denial to them of the right to
dispose of their property; 5 but rather there is a limitation upon what they may
do with their property which may result in some adverse effects upon the profit
potentialities of their business. Defendants rely mainly upon the case of United
States v. Lynah,6 which held that when the governmental right of appropriation is exercised, the Fifth Amendment guarantees compensation and there is
an implied promise on the part of the government to pay the value of the
property.1 The broad language of the Lynah case, it may be argued, lends some
8
The validity of tire rationing is involved in Standard Oil Co. v. Angle,
(C. C. A. 5th, 1942) 128 F. (2d) 728, and Henderson v. Smith-Douglass Co., (D. C.
Va. 1942) 44 F. Supp. 681.
4
Marcus, "The Taking and Destruction of Property Under a Defense and War
Program," 27 CoRN. L. Q. 317, 476 at 516 (1942).
5
For seventeen days tire dealers were not allowed to sell new tires and tubes, 6
FED. REG. 6406 (1941); but after the expiration of this period sales were allowed to
those who had certificates from rationing boards. 6 FED. REG. 6792, 6795 (1941);
7 FED. REG, 72, 1027, 1089 (1942).
6
188 U.S. 445, 23 S. Ct. 349 (1903). Plaintiff brought an action to recover
compensation for lands he alleged were flooded and rendered unfit for cultivation, by
construction by the United States of dams in the Savannah River. Held, when the
government appropriates property it does not claim as its own, it does so under an
implied contract that it will pay the value of such property. To the same effect, United
States v. Great Falls Mfg. Co., II2 U.S. 645, 5 S. Ct. 306 (1884); Hollister v.
Benedict & Burnham Mfg. Co., II3 U.S. 59, 5 S. Ct. 717 (1885).
1 " • • • when the government appropriates property which it does not claim as its
own it does so under an implied contract that it will pay the value of the property it
so appropriates. . . . All private property is held ,subject to the necessities of the
government. The right of eminent domain underlies all such rights of property. The
government may take personal or real property whenever its necessities or the exigencies of the occasion demand. So the contention that the government had a paramount
right to appropriate this property may be conceded, but the Constitution in the Fifth
Amendment guarantees that when this governmental right of appropriation-this asserted paramount right-is exercised it shall be attended by compensation." United
States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 at 464-465, 23 S. Ct. 349 (1903).
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support to defendants' contention that there is a taking of their property; but
this language must be read in light of the particular fact situation there presented and of the view stated by the Supreme Court in numerous cases both
before and after the Lynah decision that the provision of the Fifth Amendment
prohibiting the taking of private property for public use without just compensation or due process of law applies only to direct injuries,8 there being no liability
for consequential damages. "But destruction of, or injury to, property is frequently accomplished without a 'taking' in the constitutional sense. . .. There
are many laws and governmental operations which injuriously affect the value
of or destroy property ••. but for which no remedy is afforded." 9 This limitation relieves the government of liability which might tend to impede the adoption of regulatory measures 10 and obviates the difficulty of determining compensation for injury which frequently is highly conjectural. The Court in the
principal case :finds that there is no taking 11 of defendants' property but only a
regulation as to its disposition.12 This position of the Court is analogous to that
taken in several cases arising under the Lever 18 and War-Time Prohibition
Acts 14 passed at the time of the last war.15 Since defendants' injury, if any,
8 "Closely ,allied ••• is the argument pressed upon us that the legal t~nder acts
were prohibited by the spirit of the fifth amendment, which forbids taking private
property for public use without just compensation or due process of law. That provision has always been understood as referring only to a direct appropriation, and not
to consequential injuries resulting from the exercise of lawful power. It has never been
supposed to have any bearing upon, or to inhibit laws that indirectly work harm and
loss to individuals." Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. (79 U. S.) 457 at 551 (1871).
See Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 294 U.S. 240; 55 S. Ct. 407 (1935);
Horstmann Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 138, 42 S. Ct. 58 (1921); Union Bridge
Co. v. United Stites, 204 U.S. 364, 27 S. Ct. 367 (1907); Bedford v. United
States, 192 U.S. 217, 24 S. Ct. 238 (1904); Northern Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99
U.S. 635 (1879); Twin Falls Canal Co. v. American Falls Reservoir District,
(C. C. A. 9th, 1932) 59 F. (2d) 19, cert. denied, 287 U.S. 638, 53 S. Ct. 87
(1932).
9 Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502 at 508-509, 43 S. Ct.
437 (1923).
10 See Pine Hill Coal Co. v. United States, 259 U.S. 191 at 196, 42 S. Ct. 482
(1922).
11 The Court argues that, even assuming there had been a taking, under the
Fifth Amendment and the Lynah case the government has impliedly promised to pay
for the property and defendants have their remedy. Principal case, 46 F. Supp. 682
at 685.
12 See Standard Oil Co. v. Angle, (C. C. A. 5th, 1942) 128 F. (2d) 728 at 730.
13 40 Stat. L. 276 (1917).
14 40 Stat. L. 1046 (1918). _
15 Lever Act: Morrisdale Coal Co. v. United States, 259 U.S. 188, 42 S. Ct.
481 (1922); Pine Hill Coal Co. v. United States, 259 U.S. 191, 42 S. Ct. 482
(1922). War-Time Prohibition Act: Ruppert, Inc. v. Caffey, 251 U.S. 264, 40
S. Ct. 141 (1920); Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries & Warehouse Co., 25 I U.S.
146, 40 S. Ct. 106 (1919). The same result was reached in United States Bedding
Co. v. United States, 266 U.S. 491, 45 S. Ct. 182 (1925); Campbell v. United
States, 266 U. S. 368, 45 S. Ct. 115 (1924); Omnia Commercial Co. v. United
States, 261 U.S. 502, 43 S. Ct. 437 (1923).
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results from obedience to regulations 16 which apply generally to all tire dealers
and are reasonably suited to accomplish the end sought, there would seem to be
ample ground for holding that there is not a compensable taking. Whether
governmental regulation direct and highly burdensome in its impact upon property rights would constitute a compensable taking remains to be decided, but the
reliance by the court in the principal case upon the military necessity argument
suggests that acts constituting a taking in peacetime may not be so regarded in
time of war.17 From recent cases 18 in which exercise of federal power has been
grounded upon the military necessity argument there emerges the pattern of
judicial reasoning likely to be followed with respect to the measures taken in
the interests of effective military and economic mobilization-that while the
exercise of the war powers is subject to applicable provisions of the Constitution,
among which are the guarantees of the Fifth Amendment, the rights of the
individual are not absolute and must be subject to such limitation as national
security requires.19
Malcolm M. Dtlf1Jisson

16 ". • • no lawmaking power promises by implication to make good losses that
may be incurred by obedience to its commands." Morrisdale Coal Co. v. United States,
259 U.S. 188 at 190, 42 S. Ct. 481 (1922).
17 See Portsmouth Harbor Land & Hotel Co. v. United States, 260 U.S. 327,
43 S. Ct. 135 (1922).
18 Henderson v. Smith-Douglass Co., (D. C. Va. 1942) 44 F. Supp. 681; United
States v. Hirabayasahi, (D. C. Wash. 1942) 4.6 F. Supp. 657; Ex parte Kanai, (D. C.
Wis. 1942) 46 F. Supp. 286; Swift v. Hale Pontiac Sales (Mun. Ct., Syracuse, 1942)
34 N. Y. S. (2d) 888. Cf. United States v. Yasui, (D. C. Ore. 1942) 11 L. W. 2413.
19 Principal case, 46 F. Supp. 682 at 688.

